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about facial recognition, but a comprehensive regulatory framework is yet to be developed.
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FACIAL RECOGNITION IN CHINA
INTRODUCTION
In China, facial recognition is undisputedly the most widely adopted artificial intelligence
(“AI”) technology, having been applied in a wide range of sectors for a variety of purposes, ranging
from facilitating identification to improving efficiency.1 The Chinese government, in recognition of the
efficiency gain that facial recognition can create in both public and private sectors, has attached great
importance to this technology’s research, development, deployment, and commercialization. 2 As a
result, facial recognition touches upon almost every aspect of an individual’s life in China—for example,
facial recognition has been widely used in containing the COVID-19 outbreak by verifying identity
without person-to-person contact.3
Against this background, there are growing concerns in China about the widespread use of
facial recognition as it increases in popularity across almost every sector.4 A large number of media
reports point out that facial recognition technology, as used in the private sector, is prone to problems
that include lack of transparency and issues with cybersecurity, such as data leakage.5 Concerns are also
raised from a regulatory standpoint; a report from a multi-agency task force recently published an article
highlighting widespread privacy issues indicated in a survey of mobile applications using facial
recognition in China. Issues identified include forcing users to provide facial information, a lack of clear
rules for information collection, and an inability for data subjects to withdraw consent to the collection
and use of facial information.6
Despite all the controversy, at present, there is no comprehensive regulatory framework to
1

See Lauren Dudley, China’s Ubiquitous Facial Recognition Tech Sparks Privacy Backlash, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 7,
2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/chinas-ubiquitous-facial-recognition-tech-sparks-privacy-backlash [https://perma.cc
/ND2P-AHHX]. “Facial recognition is a biometric software application capable of uniquely identifying or verifying a person by
comparing and analysing patterns based on the person’s facial contours.” WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, A FRAMEWORK FOR
RESPONSIBLE LIMITS ON FACIAL RECOGNITION USE CASE: FLOW MANAGEMENT 16 (2021).
2
See, e.g., Cujin Xin Yidai Rengong Zhineng Chanye Fazhan San Nian Xingdong Jihua (促进新一代人工智能产业
发 展 三 年 行 动 计 划 ) [Three-Year Action Plan to Develop a New Generation of the Artificial Intelligence Industry]
(promulgated by MIIT, Dec. 14, 2017), http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n1652930/n3757016/c5960820/part/
5960845.docx [https://perma.cc/N8RK-A7EF] [hereinafter Three-Year AI Plan].
3
Qunxin Feng & Zhifang Chen, Yiqing Jiasu Ren Lian Shibie Luodi: Duo Di Shidian AI Menjin, Jumin Shua Lian
Heyan Jiankang Ma (疫情加速人脸识别落地：多地试点 AI 门禁，居民刷脸核验健康码) [COVID-19 Results in Increased
Adoption of AI: Pilot AI Access Control is Implemented in Many Locations, Residents Check Their Health through Facial
Scans], AI Qianshao Zhan (AI 前 哨 站 ) [AI OUTPOST] (Mar. 22, 2020), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/
0kUzDlzg8n095LSEhLSDIA [https://perma.cc/A7SU-QPFV].
4
See, e.g., Jingti! Ren Lian Shibie Biehou de “Mangqu” (警惕！人脸识别背后的”盲区”) [Alert! The “Blind Spot” of
Facial Recognition], CHINA YOUTH DAILY (Jan. 7, 2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-01/07/c_1125428533.htm
[https://perma.cc/T63F-BEQA].
5
See, e.g., Ren Lian Shibie Luodi Changjing Guancha: Jishu Lanyong, Yingyong Mangqu, Qi Cheng Daxin Xinxi Xielou
( 人 脸 识 别 落 地 场 景 观 察 ： 技 术 滥 用 、 应 用 盲 区 、 七 成 担 心 信 息 泄 露 ) [Observation of Facial Recognition
Implementation: Abuse of Technology, Blind Spots of Applications, 70% of Users Concerned About Data Breaches], CBDIO
(Jan. 7, 2020), https://kuaibao.qq.com/s/20200107A0I4BF00?refer=spider [https://perma.cc/N8U4-T2NE].
6
See Meiyoule Xuanze Quan he Zhiqing Quan, Ren Lian Ren Bie Hai Zhide Xinren Ma? (没有了选择权和知情权，
人脸人别还值得信任吗？) [Without the Right of Choice or the Right to be Informed, Can Facial Recognition be Trusted?],
CYBERSPACE ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA (Feb. 20, 2020), http://www.cac.gov.cn/2020-02/20/c_1583740234425125.htm
[https://perma.cc/F8W8-UQUS].
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guide use of facial recognition in China by entities that range from government agencies responsible
for public security or providing public services, state-owned enterprises that provide utilities and
essential services, to private entities that are looking to capture the commercial benefit of this new
technology. While the government is making efforts to address this issue—for example, in the Personal
Information Protection Law (“PIPL”), 7 which dedicates an article to regulating the use facial
recognition—current laws and regulations related to facial recognition are fragmented and ambiguous
and individuals are often not provided with a valid choice to opt out of the deployment of this
technology. Also, as shown by early cases, individuals have limited likelihood to obtain relief unless
specific rights and interests are violated. Although recent judgments demonstrate that the judicial
community is increasingly aware of the importance of personal information protection, this burden
could still be hard to prove.8
In contrast, in the past few years, the conversation around facial recognition in Europe and
the United States (“US”) has expanded from the narrow discussion of “notice and consent” from a
privacy standpoint to perimeters and safeguards around a wider range of use cases in both public and
privacy sectors. Indeed, both Europe and the US have (1) identified looming issues with possible
intrusions into individual privacy, the potential for bias, and inaccurate results resulting from the
technology, as well as (2) drafted or enacted corresponding legislation that places a heavy emphasis on
weighing public versus individual rights and ensuring appropriate public oversight.
Given the above, this paper will (1) examine the current implementation status of facial
recognition in China and touch upon the reasons for its popularity through an overview of use cases;
(2) outline the current regulatory framework in Europe and the US; and finally, (3) attempt to put
forward a set of recommendations for regulating facial recognition technology in China using a
comparative analysis with the existing European and US frameworks.
I. EXPLAINING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Although some of the past literature examining the regulatory framework for the use of facial
recognition technology has touched on the margins of appropriate use, such as the need for sufficient
7
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Geren Xinxi Baohufa (中华人民共和国个人信息保护法) [Personal Information
Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (“PIPL”)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Aug.
20, 2021, effective on Nov. 1, 2021), art. 26 [hereinafter PIPL]. The PIPL also categorizes individual biometric characteristics as
sensitive personal information. Id. art. 28. In order to process sensitive personal information, the processor needs to notify and
obtain consent from personal information subject. Id. art. 29-30.
8
Though rare, the use of facial recognition technology also has led to some civil and administrative law disputes, such
as the use of the technology in universities, park management, zoos, and subways, as well as pertaining to leakage of facial
information in connection with online payment tools using facial recognition technology. See, e.g., Zhongguo Ren Lian Shibie Di
Yi An Hangzhou Yi Dongwuyuan Bei Qisu (中国人脸识别第一案 杭州一动物园被起诉) [The First Facial Recognition Case
in China: A Hangzhou Zoo was Sued], BEIJING YOUTH DAILY (Nov. 4, 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/201911/04/c_1125188289.htm [https://perma.cc/LG4C-A3HV]. Most recently, there have also been criminal cases involving the
use of fake facial information to infringe on citizens’ property rights. See, e.g., Zhangfu Deng Qin Fan Gongmin Geren Xinxi,
Zhapian An (张富等侵犯公民个人信息、诈骗案) [Zhang Fu and Other Violations of Citizens’ Personal Information], 2019
Z08 XZ NO. 333 (Quzhou Intermediate People’s Ct. of Zhejiang Province Nov. 18, 2019); “Renlian Shibie Diyi An” Zai
Hangzhou Pan Le! (“人脸识别第一案”在杭州判了！) [The First Case about Facial Recognition is Adjudicated in Hangzhou],
RENMINWANG
(Nov.
23,
2020),
http://leaders.people.com.cn/n1/2020/1123/c58278-31940450.html
[https://perma.cc/2GLT-92SQ].
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oversight,9 it primarily focuses on the privacy aspect and the use of the “notice and choice” framework
for obtaining data subject consent.10 This correctly reflects how a large body of existing law uses the
“notice and choice” framework as a cornerstone for deploying facial recognition technology, whereby
data subjects are presented with a private entity’s terms that explain rules for collection and usage and
have a choice whether to accept such terms.11
However, in recent years, and particularly in 2019 and 2020, Europe and the US have shaped
the discussion on use parameters pertaining to facial recognition technology by a wider range of entities
such as government agencies and other public bodies—not just private companies. Because public and
private use cases may diverge with respect to purposes for use, it is important to examine how
requirements pertaining to facial recognition in both areas might be different.
In Europe, regulators have focused their efforts on creating a broad, unified framework to
govern public and private sector use of this technology, with European countries furnishing
supplementary or country-specific guidance. In contrast, private sector use of facial recognition is
generally subject to privacy rules related to biometric data in the US, but local- and state-level legislators
have issued specific guidelines on appropriate use primarily in the public sector. Of note, in both
Europe and the US, legislators have focused on transparency in the form of public oversight, balancing
the need for the technology against individual rights, and defining specific circumstances for
appropriate use.
In China, the current discussions around use parameters of this new technology have not yet
fully reflected the widespread use in both private and public sectors. While China has some generally
applicable privacy rules that address the collection and use of biometric data, it is unclear whether these
rules are enforceable in cases where government agencies or state-owned enterprises providing utilities
and essential services deploy this technology.12 Individuals usually have far less power to opt out of
such collection and use, and it is hard to obtain any relief if there is misuse or harm.13 Despite the lack
9
See, e.g., Kirill Levashov, The Rise of a New Type of Surveillance for which the Law Wasn’t Ready, 15 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 164, 192 (2013).
10

See, e.g., Sharon Nakar & Dov Greenbaum, Now You See Me. Now You Still Do: Facial Recognition Technology and the
Growing Lack of Privacy, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 88, 90-107 (2017); Robert Warner & Robert Sloan, Beyond Notice and Choice:
Privacy, Norms, and Consent, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 370, 370 (2014); Elias Wright, Comment, The Future of Facial Recognition is Not
Fully Known: Developing Privacy and Security Regulatory Mechanisms for Facial Recognition in the Retail Sector, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 611 (2019).
11

Warner & Sloan, supra note 10, at 374.

For example, Beijing Subway has introduced a facial recognition system for security checks, despite controversy incited
by earlier efforts in 2019. See Alistair Baker-Brian, Are These ‘Fast Lanes’ the Future of Beijing Subway Stations? (Dec. 28, 2021),
https://www.thatsmags.com/beijing/post/33844/are-these-fast-lanes-the-future-of-beijing-subway-stations
[https://perma.cc/ZM93-Z38D]; Rui Guo, Ren Lian Shibie, Pingdeng Bauhu Yu Qiyue Shehui (人脸识别、平等保护与契约社
会 )[Face Recognition, Equal Protection and the Social Contract], RULE OF LAW DAILY (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.sohu.com/a/359726235_99923264 [https://perma.cc/ZH8Q-VE8N].
12

13

For example—and discussed further below—Beijing’s Notice on Further Strengthening of Supervision and
Administration of Subletting and Leasing Public Rental Housing requires the use of facial recognition technology to monitor
entryways in public housing without any further detail for implementation. See, e.g., Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Gonggong Zulin
Zhufang Zhuang Zu Zhuanjie Xingwei Jiandu Guanli Gongzuo de Tongzhi (关于进一步加强公共租赁住房转租转借行为
监督管理工作的通知，京建法【2018】23 号) [Notice on Further Strengthening of Supervision and Administration of
Subletting and Leasing Public Rental Housing, Beijing Construction Regulation No.23 [2018]] (Promulgated by Beijing Comm.
of Housing and Urban-Rural Dev., Oct. 24, 2018) [hereinafter Beijing Housing Notice].
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of use parameters and specific guidance, current Chinese rules governing use of facial recognition in
the public sector generally encourages greater use and integration of the technology, leaving out
important concerns of how to strike a balance between individual interests and public needs.
As recent legislation trends in Europe and the United States have revealed, focusing solely on
privacy protection under concepts such as the “notice and choice” framework provided to individuals
vis-a-vis companies in commercial transactions cannot adequately encompass the full extent of
necessary governance for facial recognition technology. Instead, it is important to discuss appropriate
use parameters for how facial recognition can be deployed in both public and private sectors. This need
is clearly recognized by the Chinese government, as it has proposed new language in the PIPL aiming
to set out ground rules for the use of facial recognition technologies. Yet, it is unclear to what extent
the new rules can be enforced and whether such safeguards would be sufficient to prevent widespread
abuse.
This article aims to address this knowledge gap by analyzing the current status of facial
recognition technology in China, comparing the China’s approach with the regulatory frameworks in
Europe and the US, and discussing the road ahead for China in terms of regulating facial recognition.
II. CURRENT STATUS OF FACIAL RECOGNITION IN CHINA: FROM USE CASES TO
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Over the past few years, the Chinese government set out ambitious goals in the development
of facial recognition, as evidenced by many policy documents issued by various government agencies.14
For example, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s AI strategy, issued in 2017 and
entitled the Three-Year Action Plan to Develop a New Generation of the Artificial Intelligence Industry (“ThreeYear AI Plan”), states that by 2020, the effective detection rate in complex dynamic scenarios should
exceed 97%, and the correction rate should exceed 90%.15
With the government’s strong endorsement in mind, this section examines specific use cases
in public and private sectors and discusses the role government regulations play in deploying this
technology.

14
For example, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the National Development and Reform Commission explicitly
promoted the application of AI in civil affairs in the 13th Five-Year Plan for the Development of Civil Affairs, issued by the
Ministry of Civil Affairs and the National Development and Reform Commission. Minzheng Shiye Fazhan Di Shisange Wunian
Guihua (民政事业发展第十三个五年规划，民发【2016】107 号) [13th Five-Year Plan for the Development of Civil
Affairs, Civil Aff. No.107 [2016]] (promulgated by Ministry Civil Aff. and NDRC, July 6, 2016). The General Office of the
National Development and Reform Commission also stipulated in the Notice on the Organization and Implementation of the
New Generation of Information Infrastructure Construction Project and the “Internet Plus” Major Project in 2017 that the
infrastructure of face recognition should be strengthened. Guanyu Zuzhi Shishi 2017 Nian Xin Yidai Xinxi Jichu Sheshi Jianshe
Gongcheng he “Hulianwang+” Zhongda Gongcheng de Tongzhi (关于组织实施 2017 年新一代信息基础设施建设工程和”
互联网+”重大工程的通知, 发改办高技【2016】2710 号) [Notice on the Organization and Implementation of the New
Generation of Information Infrastructure Construction Project and the “Internet Plus” Major Project in 2017, NDRC No. 2710
[2016]] (promulgated by NDRC, Dec. 23, 2016).
15

Three-Year AI Plan, supra note 2, art. 2(5).
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A. Widespread Use Cases
1. Use Cases in Public Sectors
The most prominent example of facial recognition use in the public sector is identifying
citizens for law enforcement purposes, such as tracking and pursuing criminal suspects. The
deployment of facial recognition technology in public spaces such as airports, train stations, or at public
events such as concert, has led to the widely-reported arrests of many criminal suspects.16 Also, it has
been reported that police officers in the city of Zhengzhou have been equipped with sunglasses that
contain facial recognition technology, which has already led to the arrest of seven people suspected of
crimes ranging from human trafficking to hit-and-run incidents. 17 Indeed, the efficiency of
Zhengzhou’s facial recognition sunglasses—which can “identify faces from a database of 10,000 in 100
milliseconds”—is highlighted when considering the possibility that the aforementioned arrests may
have required much more manpower and time without the availability of such technology.18
In additional to using facial recognition to pursue criminals, the government also designated
facial recognition as the “go-to” technology in many regulations that would require public bodies to
perform identity verification. Facial recognition is strongly encouraged, even mandated in many cases,
to facilitate identify verification in many day-to-day administrative matters such as notarization,
obtaining driver licenses, or providing social benefits to residents. A few recent examples include:
· In September 2017, the Ministry of Justice stipulated that a party requesting
notarization shall undergo identity verification through methods such as facial
recognition, which would be cross-checked against information contained in the
Ministry of Public Security’s databases.19
· In May 2018, the Guangdong Province created a WeChat Mini Program to provide
government services, including those pertaining to birth certificates, residence

16
For example, Wu Xieyu, a suspect in the murder of his mother, had been pursued by the police for years without
success, but was arrested soon after at Chongqing Jiangbei airport, which had upgraded its facial recognition systems. Pinghui
Zhuang, Chinese Student Wanted for Killing Mother Captured After Three Years on the Run, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Apr. 26, 2019),
https://wap.peopleapp.com/article/4103611/3961671 [https://perma.cc/DZD9-4QHL]. In addition, numerous criminal
suspects were captured at various Jacky Cheung concerts through facial recognition technology. Simone McCarthy, China’s
“Crime-Fighting” Pop Star Jacky Cheung Adds 12 Crooks, Two Drones to His Tally, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sep. 25, 2018),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2165566/chinas-crime-fighting-pop-star-jacky-cheung-adds-12-crookstwo [perma.cc/6Y48-Y7RZ].
17
Neil Conner, Chinese Police Using Facial Recognition Glasses to Identify Suspects, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/02/07/chinese-police-using-facial-recognition-glasses-identify-suspects
[perma.cc/3EN7-QCAV].
18
Tara F. Chan, Chinese Police are Using Facial-recognition Glasses to Scan Travelers, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/china-police-using-facial-recognition-glasses-2018-2?r=US&IR=T [perma.cc/ELA4-2AH7].
19
Sifa Bu Bangong Ting Guanyu Fabu Gongzheng Zhiye Zhidao Anli de Tongzhi (司法部办公厅关于发布公证执
业指导案例的通知) [Notice of the Office of the Ministry of Justice on Practical Guidance for Notarization] (promulgated by
the Ministry of Justice, Sep. 25, 2017), art. 6.
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permits, and exit/entry certificates.20 Users are encouraged to use facial recognition
to access the services provided.21
· In April 2019, the General Administration of Customs permitted facial recognition
technology to be used at Customs’ registration desks.22
· In January 2020, the Ministry of Public Security required the Traffic Management
Department’s online traffic schools to verify user identity through technical means,
“such as facial recognition.” 23 Moreover, where the Traffic Management
Department organizes on-site education of traffic laws and related knowledge, the
driver’s identity shall similarly be verified through facial recognition technology.24
· In February 2020, for purposes of monitoring and containing COVID-19, Ant
Financial launched a QR code system that assigns users one of three color codes to
denote the status of their health and allows them to “obtain their codes by entering
their name, national identity number and registering with facial recognition.”25
Note that in these regulations, use parameters or specific guidance are not discussed with
respect to how facial recognition is deployed. Additionally, none of the promulgated rules address
security measures to protect facial information.
2. Hybrid Use
With the strong support by the government, state-owned enterprises in various industries
have begun to use facial recognition technology to conduct identity verification for a wide range of
uses. For example, state-owned enterprises are encouraged to use facial recognition technology largely
for streamlining identity verification:
· 12306 China Railway’s (“12306”) privacy policy notifies users that certain biometric
information, such as a facial scan, is required where users would like to log in to their
20

Guangdong: Xiaocheng Xu Qiaodong Da Gaige (广东：小程序撬动大改革) [Guangdong: mini-app leads to big
reform] GUANGMING DAILY (Dec. 12, 2019), http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2019/1212/c415067-31503048.html
[perma.cc/SDV3-5NMR].
21

Id.

22

Haiguan Jianguan Zuoye Changsuo (Changdi) Jiankong Shexiangtou Shezhi Guifan (海关监管作业场所（场地）
监控摄像头设置规范) [Customs Worksite Supervision (Property) Surveillance Setup Specifications] (promulgated by General
Admin. Customs, Apr. 22, 2019).
23

Jieshou Jiaotong Anquan Jiaoyu Jianmian Daolu Jiaotong Anquan Weifa Xingwei Jifen Gongzuo Guifan (Shixing)
(接受交通安全教育减免道路交通安全违法行为记分工作规范（试行）) [Rules on Accepting Traffic Safety Education to
Reduce Illegal Traffic Behavior (Trial)] (promulgated by the Ministry of Pub. Sec., Jan. 14, 2020), art. 12.
24

Id. art. 16(2).

25

Minghe Hu, Beijing Rolls Out Colour-Coded QR System for Coronavirus Tracking Despite Concerns Over Privacy, Inaccurate
Ratings, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/tech/apps-social/article/3064574/beijing-rolls-outcolour-coded-qr-system-coronavirus-tracking [perma.cc/5R65-SXK8].
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accounts through facial recognition.26 Facial recognition can also be used to retrieve
account passwords.27
· The People’s Bank of China (“PBC”) issued rules on facial recognition technology
for bank account verification. Since 2016, PBC required banks to comply with
verification procedures of client identity for certain types of bank accounts, with
assistance by technical means, “including facial recognition technology.” 28 In
addition, PBC encouraged banks to use technical means such as facial recognition
to assist in reading, collecting, and verifying client information during the process of
opening an account.29
· In January 2019, the Beijing Municipal Commission required the Beijing housing
construction plan to incorporate facial recognition technology in public housing
projects, such as in entryways to prevent unauthorized access.30
· On February 13, 2019, the National Health Commission encouraged pilot medical
institutions to use facial recognition technology to strengthen management of
nurses.31
· Since 2018, facial recognition has become the foundation of the “smart city” in
Shanghai. Shanghai’s Municipal Government requires the installation of AI
equipment in various public areas and residential spaces. As a result, facial
recognition devices have been installed in elevators in residential areas, which has
caused controversy amongst Shanghai residents.32
Other examples also include tracking behavior of relevant personnel in essential services,
managing parks, supervising medical insurance, supervising public transportation, and completing real
26
Yinsi Quan Zhengce (隐私权政策) [Privacy Policy], RAILWAY 12306 (Aug. 20, 2021), https://kyfw.12306.cn/otn/
gonggao/PrivacyPolicy.html [perma.cc/N2YY-S9ZF].
27

Id.

28

Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Guanyu Luoshi Geren Yinhang Zhanghu Fenlei Guanli Zhidu de Tongzhi (中国人民
银行关于落实个人银行账户分类管理制度的通知) [Notice of the People’s Bank of China on Implementing the Rules for
the Categorized Management of Individual Bank Accounts] (promulgated by People’s Bank China, Nov. 25, 2016, effective on
Dec. 1, 2016).
29
Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Guanyu Youhua Qiye Kaihu Fuwu de Zhidao Yijian (中国人民银行关于优化企业
开户服务的指导意见) [Guiding Opinions of the People’s Bank of China on Optimizing the Account Opening Services for
Enterprises] (promulgated by People’s Bank China, Dec. 20, 2017, effective Dec. 31, 2017).
30

Beijing Housing Notice, supra note 13.

31

“Hulianwang + Huli Fuwu” Shidian Gongzuo (“互联网＋护理服务”试点工作) [“Internet + Nursing Services”
Pilot Job] (promulgated by the Nat’l Health Comm’n, Feb. 13, 2019), art. 3(1).
32
Shanghai Tuiguang Xiaoqu Dianti Ren Lian Shibie Guanggao Zhihuan Moshi Yu Yinsi Baohu Yin Zhengyi (上海推广小区电
梯人脸识别 广告置换模式与隐私保护引争议) [Shanghai’s Promotion of Facial Recognition in Community Elevators Regarding
Replacement Modes and Privacy Protections Results in Controversy], CAIXIN (Oct. 16, 2019), http://china.caixin.com/2019-1016/101471840.html [https://perma.cc/2K27-3QX9].
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estate registration. 33
Again, the above instances of use do not set forth any guidance on permissible use parameters
or security measures, but rather broadly require integration or increased use of facial recognition
technology.
3. Commercial Use
In light of government support and, at times, government mandate, many private companies
opt to use facial recognition technology to enhance their business operations’ efficiency.
Companies in various industries have started to apply facial recognition technology to manage
user authentication.34 For example, on September 10, 2018, the Ministry of Transport and Ministry of
Public Security jointly called for ride-sharing platforms to vet drivers by background checks and use
facial recognition to verify driver identity prior to being dispatched to users. 35 However, they did not
discuss use parameters or recommendations for security measures.
In addition, on January 9, 2019, China Netcasting Services Association issued the Short
Internet Video Platform Management Specification (“Internet Video Specification”), setting forth rules
specific to online video platforms.36 The Internet Video Specification requires the use of technical
measures like facial recognition for account verification and management, but does not specify how the
technology may be appropriately deployed.37
Mobile phone users in China registering new SIM cards must submit to facial recognition
scans. According to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, beginning on December 1,
2019, telecom companies must fully implement the technical measures “of portrait comparison
33
The Chinese government has issued several policy documents on the application of facial recognition, all without
discussing circumstances or rules for appropriate use. See, e.g., Zhongguo Renming Yinhang Guanyu Youhua Qiye Kaihu Fuwu
de Yijian (中国人民银行关于优化企业开户服务的指导意见) [Guiding Opinions of the People’s Bank of China on
Optimizing the Account Opening Services for Enterprises] (promulgated by the People’s Bank China, Dec. 31, 2017, effective
Dec. 31, 2017); Guojia Linye he Caoyuan Ju Guanyu Cujin Linye he Caoyuan Rengong Zhineng Fazhan de Zhidao Yijian (国家
林业和草原局关于促进林业和草原人工智能发展的指导意见) [Guiding Opinions of the National Forestry and Grasslands
Administration on the Development of Artificial Intellgience for Forestry and Grasslands] (promulgated by the Nat. Forestry
Grasslands Admin., Nov. 21, 2019, effective Nov. 21, 2019); Guowuyuan Bangong Ting Guanyu Bufen Difang Youhua Ying
Shang Huanjing Dianxing Zuofa de Tongbao (国务院办公厅关于部分地方优化营商环境典型做法的通报) [Circular of the
State Council’s Office Regarding Best Practices to Optimize Business in Certain Areas] (promulgated by the State Council, Jul.
24, 2018, effective Jul. 24, 2018).
34
See, e.g., Didi Zhengzai Yong AI Jishu Dui Siji Jinxing Quan Fangwei “Jiankong” (滴滴正在用 AI 技术对司机进行全方
位”监控”) [Didi is Using AI Technology to Comprehensively Monitor Drivers], TMTPOST (May 12, 2019), https://www.tmtpost.com/
nictation/3939157.html [https://perma.cc/H8WP-PZ7Q].
35
Jiaotong Yunshu Bu Bangong Ting, Gongan Bu Bangong Ting Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Wangluo Yuyue Chuzu
Qiche he Siren Xiao Keche He Cheng Anquan Guanli de Jinji Tongzhi (交通运输部办公厅、公安部办公厅关于进一步加
强网络预约出租汽车和私人小客车合乘安全管理的紧急通知) [Urgent Notice of the General Office of the Ministry of
Transport and the General Office of the Ministry of Public Security on Further Strengthening the Safety Administration of
Online Car-Hailing and Private Passenger Car Sharing] (promulgated by the Ministry Transp. and Ministry Pub. Sec., Sep. 10,
2018), art. 3.
36

Wangluo Duan Shipin Pingtai Guanli Guifan (网络短视频平台管理规范) [Short Internet Video Platform
Management Specification] (promulgated by China Netcasting Serv. Ass’n., Jan. 9, 2019, effective Jan. 9, 2019).
37

Id. art. 4(2).
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between a user’s facial features and his or her identification card”; only when the portrait comparison
is consistent can the user proceed with network access. 38
Other examples include e-commerce and social platforms which use facial recognition for
online payment services,39 mobile phones which use facial recognition as a method of unlocking the
device,40 and businesses across all sectors that use facial recognition to monitor employee attendance.41
B.

Regulatory Framework

As discussed above, to govern such widespread deployment of facial recognition, Chinese
regulators have published national and sector-specific rules, though specificities pertaining to use
parameters remain sparse and largely focus on use of this technology by the private sector. The newly
enacted PIPL, for the first time, contains restrictions on the deployment of facial recognition for both
public and private purposes and tightens collection and usage of all sensitive personal information,
including but not limited to facial data.
1. (Draft) National Standards
On March 6, 2020, China’s National Information Security Standardization Technical
Committee (“TC260”) released the final version of the Personal Information Security Standard, which,
in practice, applies mainly to entities in the private sector.42 While the Personal Information Security
Standard sets forth privacy requirements for collecting and processing personal information, it also
includes security requirements for protecting biometric information, including facial information. 43
Specifically, the Personal Information Security Standard forbids personal information controllers from
storing facial information in its original image form, though they are instead allowed to store summaries
of such information.44 However, personal information controllers are allowed to use the original facial
images for authentication or verification purposes at the end terminal, e.g., user’s device, only when
38
Gongxinbu Xin Gui Shishi: 12 Yue 1 Ri Qi Ban Ka Xu “Ren Lian Shibie” (工信部新规实施：12 月 1 日起办卡需”人
脸识别”) [China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s New Implementing Regulation: Beginning From Dec. 1, Application for
Cards Requires “Facial Recognition”], SOHU TECH. (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.sohu.com/a/357849569_115565
[https://perma.cc/A54G-GHVJ].
39
Ren Lian Shibie Zhifu Zenme Jiu Huole (人脸识别支付怎么就火了) [How Did Payment via Facial Recognition Become
Popular], BEIJING YOUTH DAILY (Sep. 7, 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2017-09/07/c_1121618680.htm
[https://perma.cc/42QV-TKFG].
40
Pingguo Xin Shouji Caiyong Ren Lian Shibie Gangmei Zhi Hu Guoshi: Zhongguo Liang Nian Qian Jiu Kaishi Yongle (苹果新
手机采用人脸识别 港媒直呼过时：中国两年前就开始用了) [New Apple Phones Use Facial Recognition and Hong Kong Media
Notes it is Outdated: China Began Using Such Technology Two Years Ago], REFERENCE NEWS NETWORK (Sep. 19, 2017),
http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2017-09/19/c_129707298.htm [https://perma.cc/55BV-Y6SS].
41
Zhongtie Si Ju Wu Gongsi Quanmian Tuixing Rne Lian Shibie Kaoqin Zhidu (中铁四局五公司全面推行人脸识别考勤
制度) [China Railway No. 4 Bureau Group No. 5 Engineering Company Fully Implements Facial Recognition Technology], CTCECC (Jul. 25,
2013), http://www.ctcecc.com/content-807-6176-1.html [https://perma.cc/DE88-GMLD].
42

Xinxi Anquan Jishu Geren Xinxi Anquan Guifan (信息安全技术 个人信息安全规范) [Information Security
Technology – Personal Information Security Specification] (promulgated by the Nat’l Info. Sec. Standard Tech. Comm, Mar. 6,
2020, effective Oct. 1, 2020).
43

Id. art. 5.4, 6.3.

44

Id. art. 6.3(c)(1).

163

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

25 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 2 (2021)
they subsequently delete the images. 45 While it is widely believed that government agencies are
encouraged to review the Personal Information Security Standard when they are enforcing the
Cybersecurity Law against companies, it is unclear whether the public sector is bound by the Personal
Information Security Standard’s requirements when they are deploying facial recognition technology to
perform public functions.46
On April 22, 2021, TC260 released the draft Information Security Technology - Security Requirements
of Facial Recognition Data (“Draft Standard”) for public comments.47 This Draft Standard introduces
detailed security requirements for the processing of facial recognition data by companies conducting
“facial verification” (to verify the authenticity of an individual’s identity) and “facial identification” (to
identify an individual).48 Facial recognition data is defined as “facial images and data that are generated
from facial images, which can be used alone or jointly with other information to identify a natural
person.”49 The Draft Standard also specifically require companies to comply with the requirements
under other data protection national standards if they only process “face images” for statistics, testing
and analytics purposes.50
Under the Draft Standard, companies using facial recognition to verify and identify an
individual must fulfill the following requirements:
· facial recognition shall not be used unless it would significantly improve the level
of security and convenience of the verification and identification process comparing
with other alternative methods51;
· facial recognition shall not be used to identify children under 14 years old unless in
special circumstances (not further explained in the Draft Standard)52;
· an alternative identification method that does not use facial recognition shall be
provided to individuals53;
· the company must obtain informed consent from individuals54; and
· facial recognition data shall not be used for purposes other than security. Such
other purposes include, but are not limited to, the evaluation or prediction of an
45

Id. art. 6.3(c)(2)-(3).

46

Cf. id. art. 1.

47

Xinxi Anquan Jishu Rennian Shibie Shuju Anquan Yaoqiu (信息安全技术 人脸识别数据安全要求) [Information
Security Technology - Security Requirements for Facial Recognition Data] (released for public comments on Apr. 22, 2021,
https://www.tc260.org.cn/front/postDetail.html?id=20210423175440)
48

Id. art. 4.

49

Id. art. 3.3.

50

Id. art. 4(c).

51

Id. art. 5(f)(1).

52

Id. art. 5(f)(2).

53

Id. art. 5(f)(3).

54

Id. art. 5(f)(4).
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individual’s work performance, health condition, interests, and preferences.55
The Draft Standard still awaits finalization as of October 2021.
2. Sector-Based Rules
Although regulators stopped short of furnishing general guidance on usage parameters, some
trade associations have been seen making attempts to draft sector-based guidelines to regulate the use
of facial recognition.
The most notable example are the usage parameters defined in a framework of selfgovernance within the finance industry. In an effort to establish rules for self-governance with respect
to deploying facial recognition technology that would allow consumers to make payments, the Payment
and Clearing Association of China began piloting the Self-Regulatory Agreement for Offline Facial
Recognition Payment Industry (“PCAC Self-Regulatory Agreement”) on January 20, 2020.56 Like the
Personal Information Security Standard, the PCAC Self-Regulatory Agreement focuses on technical
and security measures for protecting facial information.57 Importantly, members to the PCAC SelfRegulatory Agreement shall encrypt the original facial information when storing it and such information
should be separated from an individual’s financial records.58 Moreover, all members shall manage the
potential risks of facial recognition payments by establishing a monitoring system for suspicious
transactions, 59 setting limitations on the amount of funds that can be transferred through facial
recognition,60 as well as developing channels for consumer feedback or complaints.61
3. Personal Information Protection Law
On August 20, 2021, the National People’s Congress enacted the PIPL, which will be
country’s first comprehensive law in the area of personal information protection once it takes in effect
on November 1, 2021. Article 26 of the PIPL sets restrictions on facial recognition usages by stating
that “[t]he installation of image collection and personal identity recognition devices in public venues is
permissible if it is necessary to safeguard public security, to comply with relevant regulations of the
state, and to set prominent notices.”62 It also states that “the personal images and personal identification
information to be collected can only be used for the purpose of safeguarding public security and shall
not be disclosed or provided to others, except where individuals’ specific consent is obtained or the

55

Id. art. 5(f)(5).

56

Ren Lian Ren Bie Xian Xia Zhifu Hangye Zilu Gongyue (Shixing) (人脸认别线下支付行业自律公约（试行）)
[Self-Regulatory Agreement for Offline Facial Recognition Payment Industry (trial)] (promulgated by the Payment Clearing Ass’n.
China, Jan. 20, 2020).
57

See, e.g., id. art. 6, art. 17.

58

Id. art. 6.

59

Id. art. 17.

60

Id. art. 19.

61

Id. art. 24.

62

PIPL, supra note 7, art. 26.
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laws and administrative regulations stipulate otherwise.”63
The PIPL categorizes biometric characteristics as sensitive information, which requires the
personal information processor to obtain consent and explain the necessity and impact to the personal
information subject.64
4. Private Litigation and Judicial Interpretation
The first facial recognition dispute in China was resolved at Fuyang District People’s Court in
Hangzhou on November 20th. The plaintiff in this case claimed that it was a breach of contract for a
zoo to change entrance method for annual pass-holders from fingerprint recognition to facial
recognition. The Court explained that Chinese law emphasizes that the supervision and management
of personal information processing and personal information collection needs to be legal, justified, and
necessary. Further, the Court mentioned that personal information collectors shall obtain consent from
individuals and ensure the safety of personal information being collected. In this case, the zoo provided
notice that certain personal information is to be collected when the plaintiff made decision to become
an annual-pass member. The plaintiff was well-informed before providing his personal information,
thus the zoo did not violate personal information protection requirements. However, the Court stated
that the zoo breached the contract by unilaterally changing the entrance method. The Court required
the zoo to compensate the plaintiff and delete all of his facial information.65
On June 8, 2021, the Supreme People’s Court issued a judicial interpretation on facial
recognition related cases. The judicial interpretation defines the facial information as ”biometric
information” specified under article 1034 of the Civil Code. It also stipulated that without proper
authorization of laws or administrative regulations, it is an infringement of individuals’ personal rights
for business places or public places—hotels, shopping malls, banks, transport stations, airports, sports
venues, entertainment venues—to use facial recognition technology to verify, identify, or analyze faces.
It also stated that homeowners or property users should have alternative means to verify identity if
property management companies use a facial recognition system to manage entrance or exit of the
property. The judicial interpretation also clarified the meaning of consent for processing facial
information. In addition, the Court also listed exemptions from civil liability, such as processing facial
information in response to an emergency in public health work, or using facial recognition technology
in public places for the purpose of maintaining public security.66

63

Id.

64

Id. art. 28-30.

65

“Renlian Shibie Diyi An,” supra note 8.

66

Zuigao Renmín Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Shiyong Ren Lian Shibie Jishu Chuli Geren Xinxi Xiangguan Minshi Anjian
Shiyong Falu Ruogan Wenti De Guiding (关于审理使用人脸识别技术处理个人信息 相关民事案件适用法律若干问题的
规定)[Provisions on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Relating to the Use of Facial Recognition Technologies
to Process Personal Information, Judicial Interpretation No. 15 [2021]] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., June 8,
2021, effective Aug. 1, 2021).
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III. REGULATING FACIAL RECOGNITION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
A. Europe
1. Uniform Framework of Public and Commercial Use in the European Union
The European Commission envisions a broad regulatory framework applicable to public and
private entities, noting in particular that “[i]t is also essential to make sure that the private sector is fully
involved in setting the research and innovation agenda and provides the necessary level of coinvestment.”67 In other words, the European Commission plans to further develop binding and nonbinding regulatory frameworks governing facial recognition technology across the public and private
sectors. Importantly, however, although an examination of case law and Member State guidance reveals
that certain factors dictating appropriate usage of such technology already exist, 68 the European
Commission remains at an exploratory stage with respect to appropriate policy approach to AI, and by
extension, facial recognition technology.69
Presently, at the European Union (“EU”) level, the General Data Protection Regulation
(“GDPR”)—and the Police and Criminal Justice Directive, the GDPR’s counterpart directed towards
law enforcement entities—largely remains the legal framework under which facial recognition
technology is deployed, focusing primarily on its privacy aspects.70 Indeed, because facial information
“is particularly sensitive since it makes it possible to uniquely identify an individual,”71 the technology
falls under Article 9 of the GDPR, which sets forth requirements for processing special categories of
personal information and includes facial information under the broader scope of biometric
information.72 In October 2019, the European Data Protection Supervisor (“EDPS”) also affirmed the
applicability of the GDPR to facial recognition technology.73 However, further specificity with respect
to regulation and use parameters remain absent, with the EDPS first questioning the validity of facial
recognition technology usage by noting that “[n]ow is the moment for the EU, as it discusses the ethics
of AI and the need for regulation, to determine whether[—]if ever[—]facial recognition technology can
67
On Artificial Intelligence – A European Approach to Excellence and Trust, at 7, COM (2020) 65 final (Feb. 19, 2020)
[hereinafter AI White Paper].
68
See, e.g., Facial Recognition in School Renders Sweden’s First GDPR Fine, EUR. DATA PROT. BD. (Aug. 22, 2019),
https://edpb.europa.eu/news/national-news/2019/facial-recognition-school-renders-swedens-first-gdpr-fine_en
[https://perma.cc/2SN9-ZFT9] [hereinafter Sweden FRT Fine].
69

See id. at 1.

70

DIDER BAICHÈRE, ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, FACIAL RECOGNITION 2 (2019), https://www2.assembleenationale.fr/content/download/179314/1794787/version/2/file/Note%20Reconnaissance%20Faciale%20-%20EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X6G6-5FQS]; “Law Enforcement Directive”: What Are We Talking About?, CNIL (June 2, 2021),
https://www.cnil.fr/en/law-enforcement-directive-what-are-we-talking-about [https://perma.cc/YP22-ZAW5].
71

Baichère, supra note 70, at 2.

72

Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC, art. 9, O.J. (L 119).
73
Wojciech Wiewiórowski, Facial Recognition: A Solution in Search of a Problem?, EUR. DATA PROT. SUPERVISOR (Oct. 28,
2019), https://edps.europa.eu/press-publications/press-news/blog/facial-recognition-solution-search-problem_en [https://
perma.cc/8ZW4-5VQW].
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be permitted in a democratic society,” and if so, “we turn to questions of how and safeguards and
accountability to be put in place.”74
a. Current Non-binding Requirements

The European Commission desires a “human-centric approach” to AI, which encompasses
facial recognition technology across the public and private sectors, whereby AI shall be “trustworthy.”75
To that end, on April 8, 2019, the High-Level Expert Group on AI set forth non-binding guidelines to
assess and ensure the proper use of AI (“EC Non-Binding AI Guidelines”).76 The EC Non-Binding AI
Guidelines promote rules and principles including (1) human oversight of AI operations,77 (2) reliable
design against attacks or intrusions, 78 (3) transparency, 79 and (4) eliminating potential for bias or
80
discrimination
against
certain
groups
of
data
subjects.
On January 23, 2020, the European Parliament’s Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee also approved a resolution specifically pertaining to consumer protection with respect to
the use of AI technology (“Draft AI Consumer Protection Resolution”).81 Though brief, the Draft AI
Consumer Protection Resolution, in pertinent part, mirrors the EC Non-Binding AI Requirements as
well as the EC White Paper and calls for commercial use of AI to be tempered by human oversight,
which can override any AI decision-making.82 Moreover, companies shall have procedures in place to
remedy any errors in AI processing.83
b. Proposed Regulatory Framework

The European Commission issued a series of documents in February 2020 detailing the
overall strategy and approach to AI for the EU. 84 The Commission’s documents provide broad
principles for deploying facial recognition technology, but, like the EC Non-Binding AI Requirements,
stop short of mandating specific safeguards and measures for accountability around facial recognition
technology. 85 Indeed, on February 19, 2020, the European Commission released a white paper
74

Id.

75

Building Trust in Human-Centric Artificial Intelligence, at 1-2, COM (2019) 168 final (Apr. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Building
Trust in AI].
76
Id. at 3. See also ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR TRUSTWORTHY AI, HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=60419 [https://perma.cc/6J4M-5V8U].
77

Building Trust in AI, supra note 75, at 4.

78

Id. at 4-5.

79

Id. at 5.

80

Id. at 6.

81

Draft Motion for a Resolution on Automated Decision-Making Processes: Ensuring Consumer Protection, and Free
Movement of Goods and Services (2019/2915(RSP)), EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 0094) (2020).
82

Id. at 5.

83

Id. at 5-6.

84

See, e.g., AI White Paper, supra note 67.

85

See generally id.
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addressing, among other topics, the need for a regulatory framework that can better account for and
govern the developments in AI.86 Importantly, the Commission calls for a “partnership between the
private and the public sector,” in which the proposed framework would apply across both sectors.87
2. Case Law related to Public Use in European Countries and Member States
While legislative action pertaining to facial recognition technology remains in early,
exploratory stages at the EU level, certain EU Member States have issued guidance on facial recognition
use through case law and legislation. Major themes for appropriate use standards in various jurisdictions
explored below include the need to: (1) minimize intrusiveness, (2) strike an appropriate balance
between individual and community interests (e.g., having limitations on time and place of deployment),
(3) have a legitimate or important purpose for use, and (4) have appropriate oversight of use.
a. Sweden: Prohibition of Use in Schools

On August 22, 2019, the European Data Protection Board announced that the Swedish Data
Protection Authority (“DPA”) issued a fine to a Swedish public high school for using facial recognition
technology to monitor and track student attendance.88 The school deployed such technology in only
one class and for a limited amount of time.89 Nevertheless, the Swedish regulator determined that the
use was inappropriate because attendance could have been monitored in a less intrusive manner,
students had a certain degree of privacy expectations when in the classroom, sensitive personal
information was being processed, and the school did not perform an impact assessment—which
includes communication with the regulator.90
b. United Kingdom: Use by Law Enforcement in Public Places

On February 10, 2020, the United Kingdom’s Committee on Standards in Public Life issued
its report on Artificial Intelligence and Public Standards to address how public bodies deliver public
86

Id. at 10.

87

Id. at 3. The AI White Paper builds on the non-binding requirements the Commission drafted in 2019, with
overlapping principles such as the need for human oversight, robustness of systems, and transparency. Id. at 18. For high-risk
AI, which includes facial recognition technology, the AI White Paper uses the existing legislative framework to broadly identify
appropriate use parameters, with a note that very limited grounds exist for processing biometric information. Id. at 22. For
example, under the GDPR, processing such information must be “subject to the requirements of proportionality, [and] respect
for the essence of the right to data protection and appropriate safeguards.” Id. Alongside data protection rules, the AI White
Paper also affirms the applicability of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to AI biometric identification, in which usage is
appropriate only “where such use is duly justified, proportionate and subject to adequate safeguards.” Id.
88
Sweden FRT Fine, supra note 68. See also Sofia Edvardsen, How to Interpret Sweden’s First GDPR Fine on Facial Recognition
in School, IAPP (Aug. 27, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/how-to-interpret-swedens-first-gdpr-fine-on-facial-recognition-inschool/ [https://perma.cc/X5MA-HRQE].
89

Sweden FRT Fine, supra note 68.

90

Facial Recognition: School ID Checks Lead to GDPR Fine, BBC (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology49489154 [https://perma.cc/3TX2-JDHM].
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services using AI.91 However, the real landmark development for facial recognition technology lies in
the UK’s law enforcement sector.
On September 4, 2019, the High Court of Justice in London issued a judgment on the use of
facial recognition technology for crime surveillance by the South Wales Police (“SWP”).92 The plaintiff,
whose face was recorded by the technology, brought suit, alleging, in part, violation of his rights under
Article 8 § 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”),93 which grants the right to
privacy.94
When examining whether the SWP’s use of facial recognition technology interfered with
plaintiff’s rights under the ECHR, the court weighed the following four factors: (1) whether the purpose
of use was important enough to limit a fundamental right, (2) whether the purpose was rationally related
to the end goal, (3) whether a less intrusive measure was available, and (4) whether a fair balance existed
between the rights of the individual and community interests.95
The court ultimately found in favor of SWP.96 Indeed, SWP used such technology to locate
97
suspects and manage possible criminal damage during large-scale public events.98 Moreover, SWP’s
usage was not considered intrusive, because facial information was processed and discarded almost
instantaneously and there were no complaints nor wrongful arrests.99 The court also noted that SWP
achieved a fair balance between individual and community rights because the specific usage purpose
was limited in time and area.100
However, the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (“ICO”) offered its opinion, rebuking
this ruling, calling for statutory rules to bind government use of facial recognition technology, and
calling for requirements that law enforcement demonstrate the technology is “strictly necessary,
balanced and effective” in each use context.101
c. France: Specified Guidelines for Use

On November 15, 2019, the Commission Nationale de l’informatique et des Libertés
(“CNIL”) issued guidance directed at French public entities that planned to implement facial

91
See COMM. ON STANDARDS IN PUB. LIFE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND PUBLIC STANDARDS: A REVIEW BY THE
COMM. ON STANDARDS IN PUB. LIFE 4 (2020).
92

R. (Bridges) v. Chief Constable of South Wales Police, [2019] EWHC (Admin) 2341, WLR(D) 496 (U.K.).

93

Id. para. 19.

94

Eur. Conv. on H. R., art. 8 § 1, 2, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005; R. (Bridges), [2019] EWHC (Admin) 2341, para. 19.

95

Id. para. 98.

96

Id. para. 99-108.

97

Id. para. 11.

98

See id. para. 13.

99

Id. para. 101.

100

Id.

101

Elizabeth Denham, Blog: Live Facial Recognition Technology – Police Forces Need to Slow Down and Justify its Use, INFO.
COMM’R. OFF. (Oct. 31, 2019), https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/10/live-facialrecognition-technology-police-forces-need-to-slow-down-and-justify-its-use [https://perma.cc/PT5C-64JJ].
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recognition technology for experimental use.102 Citing concerns regarding reliability and potential biases
with respect to gender and skin color, the CNIL sets forth three requirements to adhere to when
deploying this technology.103 First, facial recognition technology can be used only when (1) a method
of authentication exists to ensure reliability and (2) no less intrusive means are available. 104 CNIL
further lists examples of potentially acceptable usage—which includes accessing public services (e.g.,
tax accounts, health insurance accounts, vehicle registrations, etc.) and automated identity verification
systems at travel hubs—and unacceptable usage, such as in schools.105 Second, experimental usage of
facial recognition technology must respect individual rights.106 This requirement contains principles
common in data privacy laws, in which individuals must (1) provide consent to processing of their facial
information, (2) receive control over their information, and (3) receive clear, comprehensive, and
accessible information.107 Third, experimental usage is only allowed under a precise timeline, with a
“rigorous methodology” detailing the objectives for use and criteria for success.108
3. Commercial Use
The increasing use of facial recognition technology in the private sector has come under
scrutiny by DPAs in various European countries and Member States. Notably, in August 2019, the ICO
launched an investigation into the use of facial recognition technology in King’s Cross, London, noting
that “any organisations wanting to use facial recognition technology must comply with the law - and
they must do so in a fair, transparent and accountable way. They must have documented how and why
they believe their use of the technology is legal, proportionate and justified.”109 Moreover, in March
2020, Swedish DPA (“IMY”) launched an investigation into the usage of Clearview AI, a tool that
applied facial recognition technology to over three billion photographs obtained from social media
platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.110 The IMY concluded that “Cleaview AI has
been used by the Police on a number of occasions” and that “the Police has not fulfilled its obligations
as a data controller on a number of accounts with regards to the use of Clearview AI.”111 The Police
was fined by IMY for its failure to comply with the Criminal Data Act and it was required to (i) inform
data subjects whose data has been disclosed to Clearview AI (if confidentiality rules allow) and (ii) make
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sure that Clearview AI deletes all the data it receives from the Police.112
Meanwhile, the Danish DPA’s approval of facial recognition for a soccer stadium marks one
of the first instances of valid private sector use. On July 13, 2019, Danish soccer club Brøndby IF
announced that, beginning in July 2019 and with the approval of the Danish DPA, it would deploy
facial recognition technology at Brøndby Stadium to identify individuals banned from attending soccer
matches held at the stadium.113 This development is notable, because “it appears to be one of Europe’s
first large-scale, private systems created and vetted in the era of GDPR.”114 The Danish DPA has
provided that, in accordance with Article 9 of the GDPR, Brøndby Stadium’s “processing . . . to
enforce a private ban list is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, and . . . the processing
is proportionate to the aim pursued.”115 Moreover, the DPA stressed that facial recognition technology
“would allow for more effective enforcement of the ban list compared to manual checks, and that this
could reduce the queues at the stadium entrances, lowering the risk of public unrest from impatient
football fans standing in queues.”116
B. United States
As opposed to the uniform framework for facial recognition technology in Europe, the US
largely does not regulate such technology at the federal level for public and commercial use—state and
local level governments have set forth some regulatory schemes governing the public sector.117 To
assuage concerns of possible civil rights intrusions that may follow from mass surveillance technology,
local governments, in particular, have been enacting legislation pertaining to the circumstances under
which facial recognition can be used.118
1. Public Use
While federal laws generally have not set forth use parameters for facial recognition
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technology,119 states, local agencies, and cities across the US—including San Francisco and Oakland in
California as well as Somerville, Massachusetts—are increasingly addressing the issue on a sliding scale
of imposing limitations or conditions on usage by city agencies or banning such technology entirely.120
Reasons for restrictions on facial recognition technology range from the need for better understanding
and training prior to usage121 to a concern that such technology may not be accurate.122
Aside from a blanket ban or moratorium on usage of facial recognition technology, an
examination of state statutes, city ordinances, and other local policies governing such technology under
the broader umbrella of public surveillance reveals four additional—and at times, overlapping—
approaches that have emerged: (1) limiting the circumstances that facial recognition can be used, (2)
evaluating the technology against predefined principles or guidelines for appropriate usage, (3) ensuring
public engagement and approval as a prerequisite to deployment of the technology, and (4) stipulating
comprehensive requirements that combine aspects of the aforementioned three approaches.
a. Use Subject to Public Oversight

In March 2018, the city of Davis, California passed the “Surveillance Technology Ordinance,”
which sets limitations on the use of surveillance technology—including facial recognition technology—
by city agencies, with the purpose of “impos[ing] safeguards to protect civil liberties and civil rights.”123
The Surveillance Technology Ordinance places significant power in the hands of the city council,
entrusting it to evaluate appropriate use of the technology.124
As a threshold matter, use of such technology for a purpose not yet approved or procurement
of new technology by city agencies is subject to a public hearing and city council approval, which
balances the need to “investigate and prevent crimes; protect crime victims and society from those who
commit crimes; protect civil rights and civil liberties, including privacy and free expression; and the
costs to the City.”125 The city agency shall first submit to the city council a Surveillance Impact Report,
which includes locations for deployment of facial recognition technologies and their potential impact
119
For example, at the federal level, foreign individuals seeking entry to the US may be required to provide certain
verification information, including biometric identifiers, though the relevant sections within the Code of Federal Regulations are
silent as to implementation, i.e., circumstances or parameters government actors must abide by when collecting such information.
See generally 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(f) (2013).
120
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on civil liberties and civil rights,126 and a Surveillance Use Policy, which includes a framework of rules
for use and safeguards against unauthorized access to information.127 In addition, city agencies using
such technology must submit an Annual Surveillance Report each fiscal year, detailing information
including complaints about usage, crime statistics, and specifics regarding where the technology was
deployed or installed.128 The city council must again balance the need to investigate crimes against civil
liberties.129
Despite the restrictions, however, the Surveillance Technology Ordinance allows for the
procurement or use of surveillance technology under exigent circumstances, albeit under temporary
conditions.130 Under exigent circumstances, the city agency seeking to procure or use such technology
is bound by certain requirements including: (1) using the technology to respond only to the situation at
hand, (2) ceasing use of the technology upon resolution of the situation, (3) keeping only relevant
information, and (4) reporting usage of the technology to the city council upon resolution of the
situation.131
i. Use (or Prohibitions) Under Specified Circumstances

State and local governments have issued guidance on instances where facial recognition may
or may not be appropriate. On October 8, 2019, California governor Gavin Newsom signed Assembly
Bill 1215 (“AB 1215”) to amend the California Penal Code, specifically imposing a temporary ban
throughout California on the use of facial recognition technology in law enforcement body-worn
cameras. 132 Conversely, on July 25, 2019, the Detroit’s Board of Police Commissioners issued an
Updated Facial Recognition Directive 307.5 draft proposal (“Draft Facial Recognition Directive”) to
“establish acceptable use for the Detroit Police Department’s . . . facial recognition software,” 133
whereby: (1) the technology can only be used on still images of individuals,134 (2) the technology may
be used to support an ongoing criminal investigation of violent crime or home invasion,135 subject to
reasonable suspicion that use of the technology on a particular person will provide relevant information
on such crimes,136 and (3) access to facial recognition technology is limited and requires usage approval
as well as manual confirmation of images at varying stages of the investigation.137
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ii. Use Subject to Established Principles

On December 10, 2019, the Port of Seattle, a government agency overseeing Seattle’s
maritime and aviation facilities, adopted a motion setting forth seven guiding principles (“Biometric
Principles”) for use of biometric technology that includes “the unique features of an individual’s face”
at facilities in the Port of Seattle. 138 The Biometric Principles were drafted after consultation with
numerous parties, such as federal agencies, airlines, and immigration groups, and in response to U.S.
Customs and Border Protection’s use of facial recognition technology for international arrivals.139
As applied to facial recognition technology, usage should be “only for a clear intended purpose
that furthers a specific operational need,” and not for mass surveillance purposes.140 Moreover, facial
information should not be retained longer than necessary and should not be used or sold for
commercial purposes without data subject consent.141 Importantly, visitors to the Port of Seattle should
have an option to opt-out of being subject to the technology. 142 To address concerns of possible
discrimination or bias inherent within the technology (e.g., age, gender, race, etc.), the Biometric
Principles require safeguards to ensure that facial recognition technology is accurate and not
discriminatory against certain demographics.143 The Biometric Principles also consider the need for
accountability by requiring publicly-available reports on the performance and effectiveness of such
technology.144 Lastly, the Biometric Principles contain an ethics component for users of the technology,
stating specifically that the Port of Seattle and affiliates should adhere to “key moral principles that
include privacy, honesty, fairness, equality, dignity, diversity, and individual rights.”145
iii. Comprehensive Approach

On March 12, 2020, Washington state’s House and Senate ratified SB 6280 (“Washington
FRT Bill”), a bill considered by legislators to be “one of the first and most comprehensive laws to
regulate facial recognition technology in the nation,” 146 targeting state and local use of such
technology.147 Key highlights of the Washington FRT Bill include the need for government agencies to
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file with a legislative authority a notice of intent to use facial recognition technology 148 and an
accountability report, which must include: (1) the proposed use of the technology; 149 (2) a data
management policy that includes how and when the technology will be deployed, data integrity and
retention policies;150 and (3) a “description of any potential impacts . . . on civil rights and liberties, . . .
and the specific steps the agency will take to mitigate the potential impacts and prevent unauthorized
use.”151 The Washington FRT Bill also notes that, where the technology is used “to make decisions that
produce legal effects” concerning consumers, such as financial services or employment, human review
should be available to assess the decisions. 152 Additionally, government agencies may not use the
technology for surveillance unless (1) a warrant is obtained, (2) exigent circumstances exist, or (3) a
court order is obtained to assist in locating a missing person or identify a deceased person.153 With
respect to law enforcement, the Washington FRT Bill state and local law enforcement agencies may
not use findings derived from facial recognition technology alone to establish probable cause.154 Finally,
the Washington FRT Bill prohibits using facial recognition technology on individuals “based on their
religious, political, or social views or activities, participation in a particular noncriminal organization or
lawful event, or actual or perceived race, ethnicity, citizenship, place of origin, immigration status, age,
disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or other characteristic protected by law.”155
2. Commercial Use
In the commercial sector, there are presently no laws that specifically address use parameters
for facial recognition technology, though three states—Illinois, Texas, and Washington—have enacted
legislation governing the collection and use of biometric information, which generally encompasses
facial recognition technology. 156 Such state statutes, however, govern facial recognition technology
from an information privacy perspective, which implements a “Notice and Choice” framework,
whereby data subjects are presented with a private entity’s terms that explain rules for collection and
usage and have a choice whether to accept such terms.157
With the dearth of legislation governing appropriate use of facial recognition technology,
government agencies have responded by releasing best practice principles and codes of conduct on use
of facial recognition technology. For example, the Federal Trade Commission issued a 2012 staff report
148
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on best practices for facial recognition technology in the commercial sector.158 Similarly, the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration began a privacy multistakeholder process to
develop a voluntary code of conduct for facial recognition technology, culminating in a set of guidelines
in 2016 entitled, “Privacy Best Practice Recommendations for Commercial Facial Recognition Use.”159
However, these recommendations and guidelines also focus on privacy considerations with respect to
“Notice and Choice” and do not set forth allowable use perimeters.160
Notwithstanding the above, companies like Microsoft have responded to government
regulators’ relative lack of guidance on facial recognition technology by proposing, in part, to adhere to
self-regulatory principles until legislative action sets clear boundaries for usage.161 Indeed, Microsoft
has already developed certain principles that include the need to minimize bias and discrimination
which may be inherent in the technology, as well as accountability in the form of manual review of
facial identifications and the establishment of communication channels for data subjects to voice their
concerns.162 Crucially, Microsoft’s principles also address the area of law enforcement within the arena
of public use, noting that such of the technology is appropriate under only three scenarios: (1) where
there are laws that regulate parameters for use in public areas, (2) where a court order authorizes use to
surveil a specified individual in a public space, and (3) where there is imminent risk of harm to a
person.163
IV. CONCLUSION – WHAT IS THE ROAD AHEAD FOR CHINA?
Despite the widely shared questioning of China’s use of facial recognition for surveillance and
control by international observers, Chinese legislators are not pressured to reduce such use.
Domestically, as recent research shows, Chinese citizens seem to favor convenience and improved
security, just like citizens from Germany, the UK, and the US.164 To be sure, facial recognition has been
used in China far more extensively than in EU and the US. It also means that the lack of a
comprehensive framework to address infringement of individual rights and other negative impacts have
158
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caused tangible negative consequences. 165 Chinese legislators are pressured to handle the negative
consequences, which builds up social tensions and endangers the acceptance of the technology.
Tensions continue to grow due to the mandatory usage of facial recognition in many fields, such as
telecom companies’ requirement for mobile phone users to submit to facial recognition scans
when registering new SIM cards and the deployment of facial recognition in the subway stations.166
The need for a comprehensive regulatory framework to guide the use of facial recognition can also be
seen in the unusual attention that a pending case between a Hangzhou resident and a wildlife park has
attracted, where the wildlife park required ticket-holders to submit to facial recognition technology in
order to enter into the park, a requirement that was viewed as disproportionate by the plaintiff.167 The
court’s decision was widely viewed as inadequately addressing the core issue. 168 The judicial
interpretation issued by Chinese Supreme People’s Court could be seen as a further response to the
need to address the issue.
Banning facial recognition does not appear to be a viable choice for Chinese legislators, given
there has no precedent that they made laws to roll back from a policy to encourage the use of any
technology made by other government branches. Their policy views seem to be vindicated by the
lessons learned in other countries. The recent bans or moratoriums on facial recognition by some local
authorities in the US have caused consequences that regulators did not intend. 169
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What IS the Road Ahead for China?
Given the negative consequences and the social tensions with the deployment of facial
recognition, Chinese legislators need to make rules that establish basic rights for individuals. These
rules, in addition to guiding the commercial collection, use, and security of biometric data through a
more robust privacy regime, should also address a number of key issues specific to public use of facial
recognition in China. For example, there should be discussions about the government’s access,
including local governments, to commercial databases that contain detailed geolocation data about
individuals derived from facial recognition systems operated by a wide range of service providers,
ranging from telecom providers to banks to ride-hailing platforms. In addition, oversight of appropriate
law enforcement activities, such as detailed approval procedures before the deployment, as well as
judicial remedies after the fact, should also be included in the rulemaking discussions. Finally, questions
about transparency of public uses should also be discussed -for example, whether the deployment of
such a technology in public space should be disclosed, whether details of the deployment such as
information on which government agencies are deploying it, what are the types of data collected and
processed, and how long such data will be retained. Without these discussions, it is unlikely that a
comprehensive framework could be developed.
In addition to formal rulemaking, the Chinese standardization authority has started to explore
a risk management approach towards the deployment of AI technologies, which include facial
recognition. In 2018, it published a white paper recommending a tailored risk-management system for
activities with various risk levels. 170 This risk-based framework could further support the formal
rulemaking process in China by allowing regulators to assess the risks associated with various uses and
ensure that public or private entities looking to deploy this technology understand these risks and build
up governance structures and protocols to manage them.171

Regulations Go Too Far?, GOV’T TECH. MAG., https://www.govtech.com/opinion/when-do-privacy-regulations-go-too-far.html
(last visited Nov. 26, 2021). See also Jack Lavin, Letter to the Editor, Flawed Illinois Law Protecting Biometric Data Leads to Frivolous
Lawsuits Against Businesses, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Mar. 31, 2021), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2021/3/31/22360388/bipabiometric-information-privacy-act-illinois-chamber-of-commerce [https://perma.cc/BC6Z-W65N]. But see Editorial, Don’t Gut
Illinois Law That Prohibits the Secret Sale of Our Fingerprints and Other Biometric Information, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Mar. 16, 2021),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/2021/3/16/22334405/biometric-protection-bipa-illinois-law-legislation-editorial
[https://perma.cc/HJQ6-ML2B].
170
CHINA ELEC. STANDARDIZATION INST., RENGONG ZHINENG BIAOZHUNHUA BAIPISHU (2018 BAN) (人工智能
标准化白皮书 (2018 版)) [WHITE PAPER ON STANDARDIZATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2018 EDITION)], 42-54
(2018).
171
A recent guideline, issued on January 5, 2021 by the Secretariat of National Information Security Standardization
Technical Committee (“TC 260”), the Practice Guidelines for Cybersecurity Standards - Guidance for Ethical Security Risk
Prevention of Artificial Intelligence, is a step further towards forming a risk-based framework. This guideline offers relevant
business organizations, academic institutions, and individuals to carry out artificial intelligence research and development, design
and manufacturing, deployment and application and other related activities. See SECRETARIAT OF NATIONAL INFORMATION
SECURITY STANDARDIZATION TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, WANGLUO ANQUAN BIAOZHUN SHIJIAN ZHINAN – RENGONG
ZHINENG LUNLI ANQUAN FENGXIAN FANGFAN ZHIYIN (网络安全标准实践指南 – 人工智能伦理安全风险防范指引)
[PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR CYBERSECURITY STANDARDS – GUIDANCE FOR ETHICAL SECURITY RISK PREVENTION OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE] (2010), https://www.tc260.org.cn/file/zn10.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6HE-Y6WM].
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